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Introduction 
The phenomenon of pilgrimage touches the deep 
psychic and corporeal experience of being human. On 
the one hand, the notion of ‘pilgrimage’ reminds us 
that our lives are founded on desire, a fact that is both 
animating and haunting. On the other hand, the act of 
pilgrimage allows for a cathartic expression of this 
deeply creative ground of our humanness that can open 
us to healing and liberation. The key insights for this 
article will come from three sources. First, and most 
extensively, they will come from the work of 
psychoanalyst and linguist, Julia Kristeva. Through the 
lens of Kristeva’s exploration of the psychic structure 
of the human person, we glimpse a ‘divided condition’ 
upon which our lives are built. In my view, it is this 
divided condition that conjures up the need for, and 
living out of, pilgrimage. Secondarily, the article will 
draw on Hannah Arendt’s understanding of one of the 
three fundamental activities of the human condition, 
that of ‘action’ and what action contributes to human 
existence. As we will see, Arendt’s understanding fits 
the phenomenon of pilgrimage as cathartic. It also 
facilitates a deeper understanding of the link between 
pilgrimage and transcendence. Building on Arendt’s 
insight, when one thinks of pilgrimage in relation to 
healing and liberation, it is necessary to consider a 
transcendent dimension of human existence. To 
explore this transcendent dimension, Bernard 
Lonergan’s thought will be employed.   
It is Kristeva’s understanding of the psychic structure 
of the human person that first touches on what might 
be called a condition of pilgrimage. Kristeva posits the 
‘divided condition’ of being human as grounding 
human existence. Building on Kristeva and Arendt, if 
the road of exile, of stranger, and of foreigner describes 
an underlying human condition and is, in fact, the lived 
reality of all human beings, this wandering pilgrim 
existence is not without its joy, liberation, and healing. 
Lonergan guides us to consider the outward 
manifestation of pilgrimage reflecting the inner 
journey toward authenticity. The central idea 
underlying my overall argument is that pilgrimage and 
being a pilgrim is an outer manifestation of an inner 
psychic dynamic. 
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Figure 1 : Sculpture of Man 
Photo by Matthew R. Anderson with permission 
  
Now, it is recorded of Cain that he built a city, 
while Abel, as though he were merely a pilgrim 
on earth, built none. For, the true City of the 
saints is in heaven, though here on earth it 
produces citizens in whom it wanders as on a 
pilgrimage through time looking for the 
Kingdom of eternity.[4] 
Picking up this theme, Zygmunt Bauman draws our 
attention to Augustine’s conviction that ‘we are 
pilgrims through time.’[5] Our endpoint, where we are 
heading, is not in time or space, rather to be human is 
to journey with no recognizable end in sight. In this 
sense, a pilgrim is one who experiences his or her life 
as a journey or a sojourn, the end of which will be to 
arrive at an unimaginable unknown. The 
‘unimaginable unknown’ has not been experienced; it 
is outside of or beyond what we can know. Yet, human 
beings sense it through exposure to destabilizing 
experiences, that is, experiences that break down our 
ordinary way of thinking about and understanding 
encounters with the world. We sense an ‘unimaginable 
unknown’ through alienation, strangeness, and 
foreignness. 
In one of her novels, Murder in Byzantium, Julia 
Kristeva has the heroine Stéphanie Delacourt express 
her experience through the words, ‘Je me voyage/I 
travel myself.’ Kristeva links this expression to Saint 
Augustine, ‘who only recognized one native land, that 
of the traveller; as he put it ‘in via, in patria.’ ’[6] 
Human beings experience themselves as strangers 
because they are on a journey toward an unnameable 
destination that can be known only indirectly through 
the experience of alienation and strangeness. When 
Stéphanie Delacourt states that she travels herself, she 
is pointing to the inner journey one travels when one 
calls ‘into question [his or her] own internal frontiers: 
‘I travel myself.’ It is only on this condition that ideas 
can be substituted for sorrows, and rebirth and renewal 
become possible.’[7] 
Brazilian novelist, Clarice Lispector, expressed this 
very experience in a story quoted in a book review in 
the New York Times. According to the reviewer, 
Lispector’s story ‘symbolize[s] her own perpetual 
sense of involuntary alienation’: 
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The Psychic Structure of the Human 
Person: Our Divided Condition 
Foreigner: choked up rage deep down in my 
throat, a black angel clouding transparency, 
opaque, unfathomable spur. The image of 
hatred and of the other, a foreigner is neither 
the romantic victim of our clannish indolence 
nor the intruder responsible for all the ills of 
the polis. Neither the apocalypse on the move 
nor the instant adversary to be eliminated for 
the sake of appeasing the group. Strangely, the 
foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face 
of our identity, the space that wrecks our abode, 
the time in which understanding and affinity 
founder. By recognizing him within ourselves, 
we are spared detesting him in himself. A 
symptom that precisely turns ‘we’ into a 
problem, perhaps makes it impossible. The 
foreigner comes in when the consciousness of 
my difference arises, and he disappears when 
we all acknowledge ourselves as foreigners, 
unamenable to bonds and communities.[1] 
The phenomenon of pilgrimage in the twenty-first 
century is striking. Interest in pilgrimage and the 
activity of pilgrimages is expanding in many religious 
traditions. It is also emerging as an important activity 
for seekers who do not profess any religious tradition.
[2] In tracing the origins of the word, it is significant to 
note that the French word for pilgrim is pèlerin, which 
has its roots in peleron meaning ‘stranger’ and ‘alien.’ 
The French word stems from the late Latin pelegrinus. 
While the Latin word refers to ‘a person on a journey, a 
person who travels from place to place; a traveller, a 
wanderer, an itinerant,’ in earlier use as peregrinus it 
referred to a ‘foreigner,’ an ‘alien,’ or a ‘stranger.’[3] 
The experience of alienation and foreignness is 
reminiscent of Saint Augustine’s words in his City of 
God: 
1. Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves (transl. Leon S. 
Roudiez; N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1991), 1. 
2. See, for example, Ian Reader, ‘Pilgrimage Growth in the 
Modern World: Meanings and Implications’ Religion 37 
(2007): 210–229; Virgil Elizondo and Sean Freyne, eds., 
Pilgrimage (London: SCM, 1996); and Matthew Ander-
son, Something Grand, video, directed and produced by 
Matthew Anderson (Montreal, 2012). 
3. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed; 2 vols; N. Y.: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
4. Saint Augustine, The City of God, Books VIII-XVI (The 
Fathers of the Church 14; transl. G. G. Walsh, SJ and G. 
Monohan; Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1952), 415. 
5. Zygmunt Bauman, ‘From Pilgrim to Tourist – or a Short 
History of Identity,’ Questions of Cultural Identity (ed. 
Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay; London: Sage, 1996), 18–
36, 20. 
6. Julia Kristeva, ‘Thinking About Liberty in Dark Times,’ 
Holberg Prize Seminar, Norway, 2004. (Bergen: 
University of Bergen Press, 2005), 10. 
7. Kristeva, ‘Thinking About Liberty in Dark Times,’ 10. 
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communication, yet it remains forever outside 
language. Because the body is prior to and outside of 
language, it can never be represented. It always 
escapes attempts to be signified through the gaze of the 
symbolic realm. The body is radical alterity. What is 
represented is the attempt, in the realm of the symbolic 
to circumscribe, control, and reign in the body. There 
is an ‘original’ bodily experience prior to our entry into 
language, prior to language providing us tools for 
identification and differentiation. The original 
experience continues to impact us in ways of which we 
literally are not conscious. It is a preconscious 
experience. We catch glimpses of it now and then 
when we become aware of the desire and drive of 
obsessions and fears, of phobias and of uncontainable 
hatred or pain. We catch glimpses also in moments of 
great ecstasy, creativity, and liberation. 
This phenomenology of the body stems from 
Kristeva’s analysis of the completely bodily 
relationship between the mother and the child at the 
very origins of the child’s existence. It is that original 
relationship that is the nucleus, for Kristeva, in 
understanding our attitude toward the body at an 
individual level and a cultural level. Kristeva’s 
description of the experience of the human person 
unearths a deep, pervasive dialectic that constitutes the 
very foundation of what it means to be a speaking 
subject. Drawing on Freud, and Jacques Lacan’s 
rereading of Freud, Kristeva sees the dialectic within 
the human person as being what she terms the 
‘semiotic’ process and the ‘symbolic’’ process. The 
mature human person embodies both. The dialectic 
between them occasions the speaking subject. 
The semiotic process refers to the infantile experience, 
which is pre-subject/object, that is, before the child 
differentiates between itself and its mother. In contrast 
to some theories in child development, for Kristeva 
this infantile stage is not left behind as the child 
becomes a speaking subject. Rather, the semiotic 
process engages in a dialectical relationship with the 
symbolic process. In terms of child development, the 
symbolic process emerges with the entrance of a ‘third’ 
to disrupt the undifferentiated (from the child’s 
perspective) experience of the mother-child 
relationship. The ‘third,’ although not restricted to the 
father, signifies the paternal function. 
The beginning of differentiation is the beginning of 
language. It is a time in the child’s development that 
signifies a repression of the undifferentiated maternal 
relationship where all drives and needs are given full 
reign. As such it marks the emergence of the initial 
Lispector writes of encountering at a bus stop a 
man with a coati (a kind of raccoon) on a leash. 
I imagine: if the man took him to play in the 
square, at some point the coati would grow 
uncomfortable: ‘But, good God, why are the 
dogs looking at me like that?’ I also imagine 
that, after a perfect day of being a dog, the 
coati would feel melancholic, looking at the 
stars: ‘What’s wrong with me, after all? ... 
What is this anxiety, as if I only loved 
something I didn’t know?’[8] 
The strange tale articulated in Lispector’s story 
highlights a common experience of strangeness that 
postmodern sensibility heightens. Postmodernity 
signifies a continual shifting of realities, of 
communities, of values and of what threatens. It is a 
time of suspicion and resistance to the imposition of a 
fixed and absolute identity. It is a time of deep psychic 
distress. Pressing in on us is our own divided condition 
as speaking subjects. This has something to do with 
what Kristeva refers to as the ‘foreigner that lives 
within us.’ It has to do with the psychological disarray 
that Kristeva so skilfully and profoundly identifies, 
arising from our split condition as speaking subjects. 
In her work, Kristeva draws attention to a dialectic 
within the human psyche.[9] We are not immediately 
transparent selves in our effort to communicate through 
language. Rather, our capacity as speaking subjects is 
impacted by what is prior to language, by what has 
always been prior to language, that is, the concrete 
body of the human person. In the beginning, we are 
only instincts, drives, and needs experienced in our 
body. We gradually develop not only bodily, but also 
psychically and intellectually. Yet, that completely 
bodily realm is not left behind as we develop. Rather, it 
continues to circulate ‘beneath’ the psyche and the 
intellect, and continues to produce an effect on them. 
Kristeva speaks of both the language of the body or the 
body’s imprint in language, and also of the ‘place’ of 
the body that is outside language. For Kristeva, the 
body is the place where we are as speaking beings; it is 
the place of the material support of the language of 
8. Fernanda Eberstadt, ‘Untamed Creature,’ review of Why 
This World: A Biography of Clarice Lispector by 
Benjamin Moser. Sunday Book Review, New York Times, 
August 19, 2009. 
9. While this theme runs throughout much of her work, Julia 
Kristeva’s book, La révolution du langage poétique: 
L’avant-garde à la fin du XIXe siècle. Lautrémont et 
Mallarmé (Paris: Seuil, 1974) translated by Margaret 
Waller as Revolution in Poetic Language (N. Y.: 
Columbia University Press, 1984) comprehensively 
develops the theme. 
  
This journey between two dissociated but unified 
spheres - between body and soul - is the inner journey 
of pilgrims. It is, according to Kristeva, the inner 
journey of all human beings. New Testament 
scholarship[13] points out that Saint Paul’s mission was 
particularly successful in appealing to the liminal 
community of so-called ‘god-fearers,’ non-Jews who 
were no longer pagan but had not fully become Jews. 
In that situation, Saint Paul spoke to people’s psychic 
distress, a distress that was the result of being 
outsiders, exiles, and foreigners. Yet, Paul was not 
offering an escape from this psychic condition 
experienced as displacement, rather, he invited his 
hearers to live that liminality more intensely by 
offering them a journey. Paul was offering a lifelong 
journey that in the end, for Paul, was based on the 
authentically human, and deeply conflicted, gap 
between cross and resurrection. 
There is a tension that constitutes human existence, a 
crack that runs through the heart of every human being 
and every human story. I draw from Kristeva’s deep 
psychoanalytic reading of the human psyche to express 
something of this human experience.  It helps us to 
understand the need, particularly in postmodernity, for 
pilgrimage and the journey toward authenticity. It is a 
pilgrimage that does not reach resolution. Rather, it 
embraces a more ethical stance, what Kristeva calls ‘an 
ethics of respect for the irreconcilable’[14] ... the 
irreconcilable within ourselves and within others. 
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stages of the formation of the child’s identity. It signifies 
the possibility and capacity of the child, in being a 
speaking subject, to become an ‘I’ - one who 
distinguishes between ‘I’ and ‘other’ through language. 
Thus, the ‘symbolic’ refers to the restraints put on the 
child through ‘the establishment of sign and syntax’ of 
‘grammatical and social constraints.’[10] 
As this deep underlying structure is what constitutes 
the speaking subject, Kristeva would define the 
speaking subject as a ‘split subject.’ For Kristeva, even 
though the repression of the semiotic or maternal 
relationship is absolutely necessary for the human 
person to acquire and maintain an identity, we must be 
aware of the dialectical relationship between the 
semiotic and symbolic. If we, as individuals and 
societies, repress one or the other of these two 
processes that constitute who we are, it leads, at the 
extreme, to psychosis (the repression of the ordering 
symbolic realm) or totalitarianism (the repression of 
the chaotic yet creative semiotic realm). 
Kristeva’s dialectic of the speaking subject resonates 
with the notion of pilgrim as exile and stranger, as one 
who is on a journey and who is without a home. In 
addition to the etymological origins of the word 
‘pilgrim,’ Victor Turner has noted that historically, 
pilgrimage tended to emerge in periods of upheaval, 
destruction, and unrest, and in times of rapid social 
change.[11] When one considers the journeys of Saint 
Paul, for instance, and the ‘community of foreigners’ 
that formed the Pauline Church, we glimpse a deeply 
spiritual pilgrimage. Kristeva comments on this 
experience of the Pauline congregations: 
One thing among others is striking in the 
Pauline conception of the Ecclesia. Beyond the 
material unease of foreigners, Paul spoke to 
their psychic distress and he proposed, instead 
of an insertion in a social set aimed at 
satisfying their needs, a journey between two 
dissociated but unified spheres that they could 
uncover in themselves: a journey between 
‘body’ and ‘soul,’ ...[12] 
10. Leon S. Roudiez, ‘Introduction,’ Desire in Language: A 
Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (ed. Leon S. 
Roudiez; N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1980), 7. 
11. Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbol-
ic Action in Human Society (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press), 172. See also, S. Margaret Spivey, T. R. Kidder, 
A. L. Ortmann, and L. J. Arco, ‘Pilgrimage to Poverty 
Point?’ The Archaeology of Events: Cultural Change and 
Continuity in the Pre-Columbian Southeast (ed. Zachary 
I. Gilmore and Jason M. O’Donoughue; Tuscaloosa: The 
University of Alabama Press, 2015), 141–159. 
12. Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 81. 
Figure 2 : Chicago Library 
Photo by Matthew R. Anderson with permission 
13. See, e.g., Marcus J. Borg and John Dominic Crossan, 
The First Paul: Reclaiming the Radical Visionary 
Behind the Church’s Conservative Icon (N. Y.: Harper 
One, 2009), 89. 
14. Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, 182. 
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death’ in her emphasis on human action that 
continually creates beginnings. In my view, this links 
into the quest of a pilgrim, the quest for continual new 
beginnings. The quest of pilgrimage is the quest for the 
authenticity of beginning, of being a beginner always 
and even up to one’s death. 
The idea of continual beginning up to one’s death 
manifests in the notion of peregrinatio referred to 
elsewhere in this special issue.[18] Peregrinatio 
describes early medieval Irish monks who practiced 
self-exile not primarily for evangelization but to live 
more intensely their understanding of themselves as 
strangers. ‘Peregrinatio does not mean evangelism, 
neither does it mean ‘pilgrimage’ in the most familiar 
modern sense. The broad classical meaning of 
peregrinus in antiquity was ‘stranger.’’[19]  Rather than 
a journey to ‘somewhere,’ peregrinatio in its original 
manifestation was a journey to ‘no-earthly-where.’ It 
was a journey of continual beginnings. Those who 
exiled themselves lived a marginal existence that, at 
times, meant experiencing inhospitality, hatred, and 
scorn. These wanderers entered into and embraced 
their own never-ending strangeness. 
Like folly for Christ’s sake, peregrination is a way of 
practising self-abasement, for unlike the pilgrim to the 
Holy Places, who has a definite earthly destination, the 
exile or peregrinus has a dangerously vagabond air and 
Pilgrimage as the Quest for Beginning 
Kristeva’s ethics of respect for the irreconcilable 
suggests that to be a pilgrim is to recognize the 
fundamental dividedness within human existence, and 
to move toward it, rather than away. It suggests the 
willingness to lean into beginning rather than being 
‘thrown into death.’ Pilgrimages are beginnings. They 
correspond to what Hannah Arendt identifies as 
‘action’ distinct from ‘labour’ and ‘work.’ While all 
three activities have to do with ensuring a future for 
newcomers into the world, ‘action’: 
has the closest connection with the human 
condition of natality; the new beginning 
inherent in birth can make itself felt in the 
world only because the newcomer possesses the 
capacity of beginning something anew, that is, 
of acting. In this sense of initiative, an element 
of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent 
in all human activities.[15] 
To be a pilgrim is to act in the world and so to bring 
about something new. The inherent dialectical 
condition of being human is the underlying condition 
out of which pilgrimage emerges. The condition is one 
of being a foreigner, an exile, and a stranger among all 
others who are also irreconcilably different one from 
another. Yet, the quest of pilgrimage is not the quest 
for one’s own unique death: 
Death is a central concept in Martin 
Heidegger’s Being and Time. Heidegger speaks 
of being ‘thrown into existence,’ and the 
‘thrownness’ is ‘thrownness into death.’ 
Because death is the inevitable yet 
unpredictable future of every human being, 
Heidegger says that ‘Death is the way to be, 
which Dasein (roughly, a human person) takes 
over as soon as it is.’ And Heidegger quotes 
with approval the saying, ‘As soon as man 
comes to life, he is at once old enough to 
die.’[16] 
Heidegger’s statement that ‘Death is a way to be, 
which Dasein [or being-in-the-world] takes over as 
soon as it is,’[17] reflects only one of the two parts of 
the paradoxical Christian assertion of death and 
resurrection. Arendt counters Heidegger’s ‘being as 
15. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), 9. 
16. Grace M. Jantzen, Becoming Divine: Towards a 
Feminist Philosophy of Religion (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998), 133. Jantzen is 
quoting Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (transl. John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson; N. Y.: Harper, 1962), 
295, 289. 
17. Heidegger, Being and Time, 289. 
Figure 3 : Jim Morrison’s Grave 
Photo by Matthew R. Anderson with permission 
18. See particularly Sara Terreault’s article on ‘The 
Eschatological Body’ in this issue. 
19. Jonathan M. Wooding, ‘Historical-Theological Models 
of Pilgrimage as a Resource for Faith Tourism,’ Journal 
of Tourism Consumption and Practice 5 (2013): 62. 
  
For Lonergan, decline cannot reverse itself. The 
conditions that lead to decline,  
egoistic disregard of others ... loyalty to one’s 
own group matched by hostility to other 
groups ...  concentrating on short-term benefits 
and overlooking long-term costs[22]  
cannot be reversed from within decline itself. Decline 
has an accumulative effect, creating ever deeper and 
more entrenched distortions. The problem of evil is 
difficult to avoid. Its effect on individual intentions and 
actions eventually accumulates into systemic structures 
that are so pervasive as to overwhelm all efforts toward 
progress. One experiences the imprisonment of 
decline. It is an experience that calls for something 
beyond human effort to break the downward spiral. 
Here, Lonergan introduces a third principle, 
redemption. What overcomes decline is an act of 
redemption. For Lonergan, the solution to decline is 
supernatural, not in the sense of something beyond our 
universe imposing its will on hapless humans; rather, 
he understands redemption as that which can address a 
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so is despised; he is a voluntary outlaw. Peregrination 
is a way of imitating, and growing in union with, the 
humiliated Christ. As Dom Jean Leclercq has said: 
‘Peregrination is always a form of solitude, a quest for 
exile and destitution, a way of imitating Christ in his 
poverty, an authentic evangelical life: did not the Lord 
praise, in the gospel, the one who becomes a stranger 
for him?’[20] 
Pilgrimage as Healing and Liberation 
Pilgrimage as continual beginning, as living the strange 
and disorienting liminality of one’s existence without 
seeking a final resolution is not without joy, liberation, 
and even healing. To highlight the final point of this 
piece, I draw on the thought of Canadian theologian 
and philosopher, Bernard Lonergan. Lonergan 
understands history (both personal and social) as a 
dialectic involving two principles of change, which he 
names progress and decline.  Human beings and 
societies develop and progress yet also, at times, 
experience barriers to progress. Barriers or blocks to 
development exist due to human limitations. While 
human beings naturally seek growth and development, 
and naturally want to understand correctly and make 
decisions that will promote progress rather than 
decline, limitation (physical, emotional, and/or 
intellectual) is a permanent feature of human existence. 
Because human beings will never overcome all 
limitation, decline can set in. For Lonergan, decline 
sets in because bias blocks the natural dynamism 
within human beings toward intelligibility. The causes 
of bias range from repression due to psychological 
woundedness, self-interest (individual or group), or, 
what Lonergan calls ‘the general bias of common 
sense’ which extends ‘its legitimate concern for the 
concrete and the immediately practical into disregard 
of larger issues and indifference to long-term 
results.’[21] 
If we consider our own lives, we see that they tend 
toward progress: that is, we develop, we operate 
authentically and intentionally, and so we flourish. Yet, 
we are also very aware of times in our lives when we 
experience decline, that is, we experience our 
development as blocked by our mostly unconscious 
biases. We experience our own inauthenticity and we 
run up against tragedy, sorrow, and discouragement. 
We experience atrophy. 
20. John Saward, Perfect Fools: Folly for Christ’s Sake in 
Catholic and Orthodox Spirituality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980), 44. 
21. Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human 
Understanding (London: Longmans, 1957), 226. 
Figure 4 : Hallway Shadows 
Photo by Matthew R. Anderson with permission 
22. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1990), 53. 
  
24. Eberstadt, ‘Untamed Creature,’ np. 
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others. ‘What’s wrong with me, after all? ... What is 
this anxiety, as if I only loved something I didn’t 
know?’[24] Pilgrimage facilitates bringing this 
preconscious reality closer to our awareness. Finally, 
pilgrimage allows us to encounter the other both in 
ourselves and in those we meet on the journey. 
Pilgrimage, by throwing us into the experience of an 
explicit realisation of our alienation and foreignness 
via the act of journey, facilitates the possibility of 
offering ourselves more authentically to others in 
community. Further, pilgrimage leads us to realise our 
own need for the gift of others, received as hospitality, 
aid, and company on the way. These experiences 
promote self-transcendence, self-integration, and the 
possibility of self-sacrificing love, healing the wound 
between the semiotic and the symbolic of which 
Kristeva speaks, and realising the redemption to which 
Lonergan points. 
lack of knowledge and can restore the human 
conviction and commitment necessary for a higher 
integration. It is ‘higher’ integration because it is 
supernatural integration. That is, in the face of the 
onslaughts of evil, it is possible to believe, to hope, and 
to love. That one can live faith, hope, and love in the 
midst of decline, from a Christian theological 
perspective, is made possible through the incarnation 
of Christ and his redemptive act of death and 
resurrection. It is redemptive praxis because it does not 
escape the concrete tasks required of human beings to 
overturn hatred with self-sacrificing love. The solution 
to decline does not originate from within the situation 
of decline nor from the person imprisoned in decline. 
The solution, for Lonergan, comes from something 
more than what humans can generate themselves. 
Lonergan puts this quite succinctly in the following 
statement: 
Can a people, a civilization, recover from such 
decline? To my mind the only solution is 
religious. What will sweep away the 
rationalizations? More reasoning will hardly 
do it effectively, for it will be suspected of being 
just so much more rationalizing. And when 
reasoning is ineffective, what is left but faith? 
What will smash the determinism - economics, 
social, cultural, psychological - that egoism has 
constructed and exploited? What can be offered 
but the hoping beyond hope that religion 
inspires? When finally the human situation 
seethes with alienation, bitterness, resentment, 
recrimination, hatred, mounting violence, what 
can retributive justice bring about but a 
duplication of the evils that already exist? Then 
what is needed is not retributive justice but self-
sacrificing love.[23] 
Supernatural intervention does not override human 
freedom but takes it up and makes renewal possible. 
Faith, hope, and love are gifts allowing human 
participation with God’s act of redemption. Linking 
pilgrimage to healing and liberation, the third claim of 
this paper, has its basis in redemption. 
Pilgrimage is redemptive in three ways. First, it moves 
us to act in the world and, as Arendt points out, acting 
in the world brings the possibility of new beginning. 
Second, pilgrimage shifts us out of the illusory world 
of unity and oneness with self, and reveals to us our 
foreignness. We do not belong to this world. We 
experience exile and strangeness in ourselves and in 
23. Bernard Lonergan, ‘The Ongoing Genesis of Method,’ A 
Third Collection (N.Y.: Paulist, 1985), 158. 
Figure 5 : Love 
Photo by Matthew R. Anderson with permission 
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Conclusion 
The underlying contention of this paper is the claim 
that pilgrimage is an outer manifestation of an inner 
psychic dynamic. Kristeva provides a convincing case 
of the deep and pervasive influence of the body on 
human identity. The divided condition (that Kristeva 
asserts as basic to the human condition), can be linked 
to the phenomenon of pilgrimage. This is true not only 
etymologically but also concretely, in the movement of 
the body and its impact on the physical and psychic 
experience of all human beings as pilgrims on earth. 
Yet, pilgrimage is not only a condition of being human 
that one must endure, it is also an action that one can 
initiate. Arendt’s explanation of the importance of 
action in allowing for something new to happen is also 
reminiscent of the body’s role in the continual 
initiation of new beginnings. Finally, the experiences 
of creation and alienation that pilgrimages intentionally 
promote are taken up and transformed in the possibility 
of self-sacrificing love as the redemptive principle or 
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